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This thesis is a case study that compares actual
costs to estimated costs for a State-of-the-Art ( SOA
)
extension. The Advanced Nuclear Gamma-Ray Spectrometer
(ANGAS) program initiated by the Defense Advanced
Research Project Office (DARPA) in conjunction with the
Research and Development Division of Lockheed Missiles
and Space Company (LMSC), Inc. is the subject of this
case study.
This thesis identifies: the original description of
the technology extension; the methods used at Lockheed
to develop SOA extension cost estimates; specific
factors that helped and hindered accurate cost
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The development of new weapon systems for the
Department of Defense ( DOD ) frequently requires State
of-the-Art ( SOA ) extensions. The difficulty of
estimating development and early production costs for
new systems when SOA extensions are involved often
leads to cost overruns. In fact, contractors' costs
exceed project manager's estimates for new projects 60
percent of the time. [REF. 1 : p. 50-51.]
Prior research has not solved the problem of
accurately estimating SOA extension costs. These
development and production cost overruns make it
difficult for DOD to accurately compare existing weapon
technology with undeveloped technology.
Professor Willis R. Greer, Jr., Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, in conjunction with the
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), is attempting to
develop more reliable methodology for estimating the
cost of extensions as applied to electronic systems.
This thesis provides data to support that effort
through the case study of an SOA extension.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis details the Advanced Nuclear Gamma-Ray
Spectrometer (ANGAS) experiment program initiated by
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Office in
conjunction with the Research and Development Division
of Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc. The
objectives are outlined below:
1. Identify the original description of the
technology extension,
2. Document estimated development costs,
3. Describe the methods used to develop the cost
estimates
,
4. Compare actual cost data to estimated costs,
5. Analyze and measure any significant variances
in cost or progress in technological
development
,




How do estimated development and production costs




What methods and techniques were used to
estimate development and production costs?
2. How was technological progress measured and
evaluated?
3. What factors helped or hindered accurate cost
estimating and accomplishment of stated SOA
extension goals?
D. SCOPE LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis is a case study of the ANGAS project.
The primary task is to obtain and analyze estimated and
actual cost data, document cost estimation procedures
for the ANGAS project and to evaluate generic cost
estimating procedures used by Lockheed for SOA
projects. The technological requirements of the ANGAS
project are studied to measure the accomplishment of
stated ANGAS technological goals.
The ANGAS project, an ongoing effort at Lockheed,
is designed to produce one end unit to fly aboard a
satellite. Thus, the cost data and estimation
procedures presented in this paper are more applicable
to development costs rather than to production costs.
This is important because many SOA extensions, by their
nature, must be implemented through a substantial
development effort. At the outset of many SOA
development efforts, the end unit is more of an
abstract idea than a detailed production specification.
In the 1970 's, system acquisitions programs were
usually focused on specific technical approaches at
the time of their initiation.
Today a program is initiated after competent
authority, the Program Decision Authority, approves a
specific. formally stated mission need, based on
Mission Area Analysis, submitted within the first
Program Objectives Memorandum in which program funds
are requested. [REF. 2 : p. 1-7.
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E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this research is case
study. Research trips to Lockheed included visits with
the ANGAS contract administrator, principle
investigator, senior cost estimator and several
development engineers. These Lockheed personnel are
located at facilities in Sunnyvale and Palo Alto,
California. Lockheed personnel provided estimated
costs, the associated cost estimation methods, actual
costs incurred to date, a summary of progress,
technological breakthroughs and specific factors that
have helped and hindered the SOA extension effort.
The NAVPRO office, located in Sunnyvale, was
visited numerous times to identify a suitable contract
for study and to obtain relevant contract and cost
data
.
The ANGAS program manager was also interviewed to
determine what the government hoped to achieve from the
ANGAS project and how technological progress of that
project is measured.
Background and research data were obtained through
the Naval Postgraduate School library and its research
services. Automated searches were conducted through
the NPS library's DOD , NON-DOD and Defense Technical
Information Center's files. Information obtained
8
through visits to Lockheed during the case study and
related research material is contained in this thesis.
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Major findings of this thesis are summarized below:
1. There were no significant variances between
estimated an actual costs to date. Spending
was at a slightly lower rate than anticipated.
2. Like many research and development projects
that are administered by a "level of effort
contract", measurement and analysis of
technological development is the primary gauge
of effectiveness and progress.
3. SOA extensions, achieved by numerous smaller
scale projects that incrementally extend the
SOA, reduce the risk of both costs overruns and
failure to achieve technological goals.
4. Personnel costs are the most significant cost
factor in the development phase of SOA
extensions
.
5. Incremental funding of a DOD SOA project
provides leverage to the government that can
reduce cost overruns and achieve desired
technological goals but tends to increase the
length of time required for the development
effort
.
6. Currently available parametric models, used in
private industry, could be applied to
government use with proper historical data
application and case-by-case analysis.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides a background of the ANGAS
project, an overview of cost estimation procedures used
for ANGAS and a summary of cost estimation procedures
and models used at Lockheed.
Chapter III details the methodology used in this
thesis and present data.
Chapter IV analyzes the data in chapter III
consistent with the stated objectives.
Chapter V states the conclusions drawn from this
SOA extension case study.
II . BACKGROUND
A. PROJECT OVERVIEW
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency - 201
ANGAS program involves the design, test and
fabrication of the ANGAS flight instrument and the
performance of a long term flight demonstration in
space. [REF. 3 : p. 3-2.
J
The ANGAS project is designed to develop a gamma-
ray spectrometer that will be carried into orbit by
satillite. The spectrometer is designed to pasively
detect radiation in space through an array of germanium
sensors. The project will be completed when the
designed spectrometer has been flown in space and the
specified scientific results have been supplied to the
government. The specific requirements of the ANGAS
project are provided in the Statements of Work listed
in Appendix B.
The ANGAS system required development of a large
multi-element array of new, n-type, segmented germanium
sensors. The design concepts represent a research and
development effort which has never been performed
before. This SOA extension in gamma-ray spectrometers
incorporates the following new technologies:
1. Imaging collimator,




4. Electronics subsystem which enables rapid
onboard data analysis and microprocessor
control
5. Solid cryogen cooler.
The ANGAS program is being developed by Lockheed
Space Sciences Laboratory which is part of the Lockheed
Research and Development Division, the principle
10
research organization of the Lockheed Missiles and
Space Corporation.
The government's program manager for ANGAS is LTCOL
George P. Lasche, USA. He is in the Geophysical
Sciences division at the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Office, Arlington, VA. He described the ANGAS
program goals as:
An effort to develop new techniques and improve
sensitivity and capability to record and passively
detect radiation in space through
1
a process of
imaging with high energy resolution. 1
A wide variety of potential DOD uses for ANGAS
include its use as a means to verify arms treaty
compliance from space.
B. OVERVIEW OF COST ESTIMATION PROCEDURES USED FOR
ANGAS CONTRACT PROPOSALS
The principle method used by Lockheed Space
Sciences Laboratory to determine the cost estimates for
ANGAS contract proposals is a bottom-up, engineering
estimate. To date approximately $4.96 million has been
funded in two increments, in a "level of effort" type
contract. The projected total funding for the entire
ANGAS project will be approximately 17 million dollars.
Dr. George Nakano , Lockheed's principle
investigator (project director / technical supervisor)
for ANGAS explained that the ANGAS cost estimate:
is a bottom-up estimate that is developed based on
past experience of costs ^incurred developing similar
satellite borne systems/
The bottom-up estimating methodology used at
Lockheed provides detailed functional and cost element
estimates provided by the lowest competent level in the
organization. The cost estimates developed for each
1 Information was obtained by telephone
conversation on September 3, 1987.
2 Information was obtained in an interview at Palo
Alto, CA on September 4, 1987.
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phase of the ANGAS contract were based on historical
cost data, the requirements of the Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) and the Statement of Work (SOW) items
listed in the Requests for Proposal (RFP).
Lockheed's contract pricing proposal for ANGAS
contained the following summarized items. [REF. 3 : p.
2.2-2.3]
1. The overhead, general and administrative rates
are applied as a percent times direct labor
dollars. The rates were forecasts based on
historical data and current projections.
2. Material requirements are identified, listed
and priced by component or subsystem. These
direct purchase items range from firm prices to
estimates based on the accuracy that program
requirements were defined.
3. Procurement burden is applied as a percent of
the total estimated costs for material,
purchased serices and subcontract and outside
production costs. The rates are based on
historical data and current projections.
4. Cost of money is an element of facilities
capital. The rates are applied to the direct
labor dollars associated with annual overhead
and general andadministrat ive rates and to the
base amount associated with the annual
procurement burden. The cost of money rate used
was 10.375 percent.
5. Air fare rates are averages of recent Lockheed
ticket costs for tourist class to the
designated cities. Per diem rates are based on
historical data and current projections.
6. Direct labor hours, the most significant
component of the ANGAS cost estimate, are based
on a technical evaluation developed from a
12
detailed analysis of the program requirements.
The basic labor rates are current average rates
for direct labor pools, by skill categories
that are used in the program. These rates are
escalated by approved factors when appropriate
to allow for future labor rate increases during
the program.
All costs and applied rates were audited by the
Defense Contract Audit Agency and negotiated with the
cognizant government activity. Specific costs, rates
and audit results will be discussed in Chapters III and
IV.
Labor hour and cost estimates were based on
previous satellite flight programs involving similar
but much smaller gamma-ray sensor systems developed by
Lockheed. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
301 program although only one-forth the size of ANGAS
and less technically complex was used in developing the
ANGAS cost estimate.
C. SUMMARY OF COST ESTIMATION PROCEDURES AND MODELS
USED BY LOCKHEED
The LMSC Estimating Systems Description ( ESD )
Manual provides company-wide guidance for estimating
requirements for government or prime customer
contracts
.
The LMSC ESD Manual states:
overall responsibility for the LMSC estimating
definition, development, control and compliance is
vested in the Vice-President, Finance. The Division
Industrial Accountants report to the Vice-President
Finance and are responsible for ensuring compliance
with this document. [REF . 4 : p 1.3]
The following summary of cost estimation procedures
and models is provided from information obtained from a
presentation on SOA pricing by Mr. Ted Castro, Manager
LMSC Estimating Systems, Mr. Donald H. Palmby, Manager
LMSC Cost Modeling and Analysis, and Mr. Ken Peeler,
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Chief Industrial Accountant LMSC Astronautics Division
and the LMSC ESD Manual
.
1 . SOA Proposal Estimating Process
Figure 2-1, which follows this description of
Lockheed's contract proposal estimating procedure
provides a flow diagram of the process
.
[REF . 4 : p.
2.32 - 2.62]
The cost kick-off meeting establishes a
schedule of deadlines for completion of cost inputs.
Cost inputs and bases are generated for materials,
direct labor and other direct costs.
The Federal Acquisition Requirements (FAR)
directs DOD contractors to:
provide a consolidated price summary of individual
material quantities included in various tasks, orders
or contract line items being proposed and the basis
for pricing (vendor quotes, invoice prices, etc.).[REF 5. : 15.804-6]
Material requirements are broken down into
three categories:
1. Subcontract estimates: obtained through formal,
detailed RFPs or through estimation if
sufficient time is not available to identify a
subcontractor and obtain a price quote before
Lockheed must respond to the government
proposal. Lockheed is required to establish the
reasonableness of any estimate through an
independent cost analysis or technical basis.
2. Material estimates: includes prices for
standard commercial items, raw materials,
purchased parts and material usage costs. These
material items are priced through historical
data, supplier quotations and estimations.
3. Intra-Lockheed Work Transfer ( IWT ) Items: these
material items are made at Lockheed. FAR
requires that these items be transferred at
14
cost with an explanation of the pricing method
used
.
Once all material requirement costs are
consolidated they are reviewed and additional analysis
and justification is provided if needed or required by
FAR. A consolidated price summary of all material
requirements is then generated. Lockheed's final action
for material costs is the application of material
escalation rates if justified for a particular contract
or contract phase.
Direct Labor cost estimates must:
provide a time-phased (e.g. monthly, quarter ly , etc . )breakdown of labor hours, rates and cost by
appropriate category, and furnish bases for
estimates. [REF. 5 : FAR 15.804-6]
Direct labor estimates are usually expressed by
Lockheed in labor hours, identified directly to
research, design, production or other project
objective. To justify direct labor estimates, the
requirements of an SOA extension RFP are broken down
into tasks consistent with SOW requirements or WBS
element. The two basic methods used to provide a basis
of estimate (BOE) for hours quoted are:
1. Historical or similar to data: this is the
preferred BOE for quoting direct labor hours.
Similar programs are used to identify tasks
that are equivalent to tasks to be performed in
the proposed contract. Adjustments or applied
factors are often used to calibrate historical
data. Justification of adjustments or factors
is required by FAR.
2. Engineering estimates: used when no historical
or similar to data is available. Tasks are
broken down to the lowest level of detail.
Use of estimating standards is a direct labor
estimating method which relates production costs to
specific characteristics of a product, such as weight,
15
size or composition.
Cost estimating standards must be applied
consistently based on verified. uniformly correlated





A learning curve, which predicts the extent to
which experience in performing a task will decrease the
labor time needed to perform that task, is then applied
by Lockheed to all labor estimates. The LMSC labor cost
accumulation system is the data base used to develop
learning curves. Curve selection and slope definition
depend on a number of factors, including:
1. how the data has been accumulated (by lot or
un it),
2. whether the item is a follow-on to an existing
production run or an estimate based on a
similar item,
3. if a production break, change in design
technology or factory method has occurred, and
4. customer specification of the methodology,
[REF. 4 : p 2.61]
Once total labor hour estimates are compiled
and reviewed Lockheed direct labor hour rates are
applied to the labor hours. The estimation of "other
direct costs" and BOE is the final major cost category
that must be derived for an SOA extension price quote.
Other direct costs include:
travel, overtime premiums, allocated prime cost(APC)/pooled work orders, monitored line parts APC
,
relocation expenses and foreign field service
bonuses
.
[REF. 6 : p. 2-62J.
Other direct costs are usually based on
historical or direct estimating procedures. All
estimates for materials, direct labor and other direct
costs form the initial cost proposal which is now
reviewed and approved or disapproved. If approved
management price review and negotiation and sometimes
best and final offer steps follow.
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2 . Bottom - Up Cost Estimating Method
Lockheed uses a multiple estimating approach.
When detailed task definition is available a bottom -
up / engineering estimate is prepared by the cognizant
division(s). These bottom - up estimates provide:
1. High degree of accuracy and traceabi 1 i ty
,
2. Cost breakdowns to the lowest levels of the
WBS,
3. Based on historical data.
The primary disadvantages of a bottom - up cost
estimate for an SOA extension effort are:
1. Dependence on detailed design specifications
which do not usually exist during early phases
of SOA extension projects,
2. Expensive and time consuming,
3. Cannot be used as the sole costing method
4. Trade - off analysis is not easily evaluated.
Although many SOA extensions do not initially
provide detailed design specifications, bottom - up
cost estimating is sometimes still used by Lockheed.
Estimates are based on the experience gained by
individual engineers and technicians from developing
systems or components that used existing SOA
technology. Many of the SOA extension contracts awarded
to Lockheed are an extension of technologies and
systems developed previously by Lockheed. Bottom - up
SOA extension cost estimates are reconciled with
experience and computer cost models.
Various computer models are used in SOA cost
estimating by Lockheed to establish "price targets",
provide "sanity checks" and reconcile other cost
estimations
.
3 . Parametric Cost Models
Lockheed uses the RCA PRICE Hardware (H)
parametric cost model early in the development or
17
concept exploration stages of an SOA extension.
The PRICE model contains thousands of mathematical
equations relating the input variables to cost. Each
specific set of input parameters uniquely defines the
hardware for cost modeling. The resultant cost output
is determined from the mathematical equations alone.
PRICE does not perform the function of a table look-
up model
.
PRICE has been designed to estimate costs with a
minimal amount of hardware information. This feature
makes it a legitimate tool for cost estimation of
programs in concept stage of development , since the
model uses its internally generated values for any
missing input variables in order toestimate cost. Of
course, it is always preferable for the PRICE user to
supply the inputs, when their values are known. In
this way, the statistical uncertainty is reduced.
[REF. 6 : p. 7]
Lockheed applies the PRICE H model when okey
representative system characteristics are known.
"
J
PRICE H also identifies cost drivers and
quickly and economically evaluates SOA extension trade-
off and schedule analysis.
The major disadvantages of the PRICE H model as
noted by LMSC ' s senior cost estimating managers are:
1. Not based on actual history,
2. Algorithms need to be adjusted for different
projects, divisions and acquisition
environments
.
PRICE H relies on input of a subassembly or
higher level unit's active electronic weight and
mechanical / structural weight as the most critical cost
and schedule factors. The accuracy of the PRICE output
is directly related to the accuracy of the weights
input
.
Input characteristics of the PRICE H model
which enhances its value as an SOA extension cost
estimation model are:
1. Inputs consider the lead time necessary for
set-up, parts procurement and redesign. This is
significant for most SOA extensions.
3 Information obtained from LMSC SOA cost
presentation, September 24, 1987, Sunnyvale, CA
.
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2. The degree of new design and complexity ofdevelopment engineering tasks is included.
3. The operational environment in which the system
is to be used is evaluated in cost estimates.
SOA extensions such as the ANGAS project are
designed to be used in a new operational
environment, outside the earth's atmosphere.
4. Type and manufacturing complexity of the
electronics within the system or component is
evaluated by the model. New electronics design
is often a significant factor of SOA extension
costs .
5. The model also evaluates technological
improvement, year of technology and
technological delay or lags. These inputs are
often SOA extension cost drivers.
Illustration 2-1 is a sample output of a PRICE
H run provided by LMSC Cost Modeling and Analysis
Manager. The output has been broken down into six
sections. The following general output descriptions are
summarized from the PRICE Executive Handbook [REF. 7 :
p. 20]. Relevant SOA extension output data is also
highl ighted
.
Section 1: identifies time of the run, the name of
the item, general information about the
item, the recurring unit production cost
and monthly production rates. Illus. 2-1
identifies the item as a pyro-kit, to be
produced in a quantity of one. The unit
weight was input at 7.96 pounds, the unit
volume was .26 cubic feet and mode two
designates the item as a mechanical item
with no electronic elements. The quantity
/ next higher assembly designator is a
one which determines the number of units
required to be integrated and tested at
the next higher assembly level.
Section 2: lists program costs in engineering and
manufacturing subtotals. Illustration 2-1
indicates only production costs of 1008
dollars. Development costs are blank, in-
dicating that no development costs are
required. Many SOA extensions require sig-
nificant development costs. The ability of
PRICE H to output development and
production costs separately is useful in
analysis of technological alternatives.
Illus. 2-1 lists engineering costs of$504. These costs are composed of
drafting costs of $46., design costs of$250., project management costs of $148.
and data costs of $60. Manufacturing
costs total $505. These costs are
composed of production costs of $453. and
tools and test equipment costs of $52.
Total engineering and manufacturing costs
19
equal $1008.
Section 3: provides output useful for analysis of the
inputs with known standards. Density.
engineering changes and mean time between
failures values in Illus. 2-1 are followed
by an asterisk. This indicates that these
input values were not known and calculated
by the model. Many inputs required to
estimate the costs of an SOA extension are
not available during the early phases of
development. The ability of the PRICE H
model to derive output and then provide
missing input is ideal for SOA extensions
during early phases. Illus. 2-1 shows
mechanical design factors that were input
for the run. The manufacturing complexity
of 10.42 is an empiricaly derived value
that represents the product's
producibil i ty which is a function of
material type, finished density and
fabrication methods. The mechanical
integration level of .7 represents the
level of mechanical integration and test.
This factor describes the level of effort
required for the integration of mechanical
equipment in the next higher assembly. The
platform input of 2.2 designates the
intended operating environment. An input
of 2.0 or more represents unmanned or
manned space operations. The year of
technology, 1985, has been calculated by
the program. The reliability factor of
1.0 is a multiplier used to deviate the
mean time between failure value which has
been calculated by the model.
Section 4: outputs development and/or production
schedule information. Illus. 2-1 indicates
that the dates for completion of the first
item and overall completion were not known
before the run. The model provides valuable
schedule information which is often
difficult to determine for SOA extensions.
Section 5: provides additional, in-depth cost output.
The model again provides previously unknown
information which would be valuable
for SOA extension estimating. First unit
production costs are $452.17, amortized
unit costs are $1008.30. the production
tooling cost factor is i.O and the unit
learning curve is 86.4 percent.
The production cost multiplier of 1.20 is a
multiplying factor used to include mock-ups
for general and administrative and fee or
profit in the production cost outputs.
Section 6: one of the most useful outputs of the
PRICE H model is the cost uncertainty
measure. Illus. 2-1 provides a cost range
of 954 to 1046 dollars. SOA extension
development and production costs inherently
contain a high level of uncertainty
due to the technical innovation and
engineering complexity.
20
4 . The Lockheed STAR Cost Estimating Model
Lockheed's STAR cost estimation model combines
the characteristics of a similar-to model and an
associated model. A similar-to methodology uses
historical cost data from tasks or equipment similar to
the equipment under evaluation. A high degree of
accuracy and cost breakdowns to the subsystem or box
level (WBS level 3 or 4) is provided.
The associated program methodology uses total
annual costs from technically representative projects
that have been adjusted by economic and complexity
factors
.
The basis of the STAR model is the detailed
historical database that has been developed over a 20
year period. This data base represents actual
production and development cost experience, rather than
success oriented, or tailored data.
The STAR model is made up of three distinct
estimating models with separate data bases for each. A
flight hardware cost estimator, a ground hardware cost
estimator and a software cost estimator. The individual
models use an algorithm designed for its particular
line of business. The software cost estimator works
with a software size estimator that calculates lines of
code by functional application. The three models can be
used in an integrated manner to derive a total system
cost
.
Minimum inputs include: program hardware /
software lists, a master schedule and the year dollars
required. Critical SOA extension estimating factors
such as: design complexity, escalation of costs, and
quantity are incorporated in the STAR model.
The primary advantage of the STAR model
compared to the PRICE H model is that output is derived
21
from actual or historical costs. STAR also allows
updating of costs as a project progresses and tradeoff
and "what if analysis".
The STAR model contains a program loader that
pulls the required type of data from the data base. The
FILGEN pulls analogous cost items from the data base.
Each item on the program hardware list is coded with a
box status, box type and engineering status.
Box status codes are either: make (m), buy (b)
or government furnished equipment (g).
Box type codes are either: development (d),
qualification (q) or production (p).
Engineering status codes are either: new (n),
modified (m), existing (e) or production (p).
Each item on the program hardware list is also
assigned input values for: quality, management effort,
design engineering required, systems engineering
required, software engineering effort required, the
manufacturing complexity, test requirements and product
assurance
.
The model now makes a cost run, the Lockheed
labor rates are the default labor rate values. Appendix
C 4 provides sample output for a subsystem program
hardware list.
Final output includes: total hours, dollar
value for the labor hours, material costs in dollars
and total dollar value for each item on the subsystem
hardware list. The final total price is obtained from
analogous, historical cost data. If any of seven input
values were not initially known the total cost is
normalized and reallocated back to the missing boxes.
4 APPENDIX C is not part of the unlimited
distribution of this thesis. Individuals within DOD may
obtain a copy of APPENDIX C from Professor Willis R.
Greer, Jr., Naval- Postgraduate School, Monterey,
Cal i fornia .
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The STAR model is an ideal tool for Lockheed to
use to estimate SOA extension costs. The data base is
retrievable by line item or box level, which enables
composite data from even classified projects to be
included as unclassified useable data.
If a particular line item on the hardware parts
requirement list is going to be subcontracted or
purchased directly, the program allows these known
costs to be entered. Otherwise a data base is selected
which matches the functional and characteristic
qualities of the item. The default learning curve
value is 95 percent.
The output of the STAR model is designed to aid
SOA cost analysis. Output can be formatted to provide:
development /non-recurring costs and production /
recurring costs. Appendix C provides sample output in
this format and an example of output in WBS reference
number sequence.
The accurate, uniform measurement and
correlation of historical data into box level or
component factor enables extremely precise SOA
extension cost estimations by the STAR model once parts

















































Material Escalation and Facilities cost of capital is applied
2. The BOM is added to direct labor and indirect co3t estimates
3. Final proposal team review i3 conducted and if approved,
enter the management review







































-> If estimate i3 approved, enter
management review phase



























































Year of Tech. 1985











Economic Base 185 Tooling and Process Factors
Escalation 0.00 Production Tooling 1.00*
T-l Cost 452.17*Rate Tooling
Amor Unit Cost 1008 . 30*Pr ice Info Factor 0.950
Prod Cost Mult 1.20 Unit Learning Curve 0.864
VI .
COST RANGES DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTION TOTAL COST
From - 954 954
Center - 1008 1008
To - 1046 1046
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Ill . METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the methodology of the
thesis and presents data that was collected during the
study. The methodology section is divided into two
subsections, data collection and data analysis.
Data includes: estimated costs submitted by
Lockheed in the ANGAS contract proposals; Defense
Contracts Audit Agency (DCAA) audits of the ANGAS
contract proposals; costs questioned in the DCAA
audits; final negotiated costs with justifications;
actual costs incurred at different stages of the




1 . Data Collection
The methodology used in this research is case
study. An information search was conducted to obtain
background data. Automated searches were conducted
through the Naval Postgraduate School library's DOD,
NON-DOD and Defense Technical Information Center's
files. The following literature provides information
on SOA extensions, development and production cost
estimation issues and a background that will enhance
understanding of the issues in this case study.
Literature that is pertinent to data analysis
methodology will be presented later in this chapter.
Captain Helmut W.F. Scheel , USAF , in his
master's thesis [REF. l:p. 1-91], studied the methods,
techniques and objectives used in estimating costs for
exploratory development projects by Air Force Research
and Development Laboratories. He also attempted to
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identify factors which contribute to the variance
between project manager's cost estimates and
contractor's proposal costs. Captain H. Scheel
surveyed 45 government project managers to determine
cost estimating techniques. Important conclusions of
his study include:
1. 77.8 percent of the program managers used
historical data for general cost estimating.
2. 82.2 percent of the program managers used
historical data and experience/ judgment to
estimate labor costs and manpower requirements.
3. Low cost estimates were sometimes made because
of limited funds available for a specific
proj ect
.
4. The major variance factor attributable to the
bidders was errors in estimation as a result of
misinterpretation of the Statement of Work(SOW).
5. Contractors can sometimes propose a different
level of effort than specified in an SOA
extension due to technical insight and
capabilities known only by the contractor.
6. Establishment of a computerized system with
standardized software would provide a data bank
that would enable more accurate cost estimation
analysis within the government.
7. Most project managers do not accurately
estimate costs for new projects. The majority
underestimate by 30 percent or less, although
some underestimate by as much as 200 percent.
[REF. l:p. 33, 36, 41, 51, 67, 92-96]
The ANGAS project, like most SOA extension
efforts, requires a long research and development (R&D)
period. To accurately estimate and evaluate proposed
contractor costs an understanding of long-range
corporate R&D planning is useful. Ward C. Lowe framed
the process into seven significant steps:
1. Specify as clearly as possible the basic
technological objectives which are of primary
interest. These may be stated broadly at the
beginning but must eventually be broken down
into particular areas.
2. Identify the goals toward which the company is
working, which ideally are set forth in the
corporate and the research objectives.
3. In keeping with the preceding two factors,
seriously and imaginatively consider all
possible results which may be achieved if the
research efforts are successful.
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4. Rank the hypothetical capabilities of the
research efforts as determined in the preceding
step, in terms of their potential contribution
to the achievement of specific goals. The
ranking should achieve the corporate or the
research objectives.
5. Outline the principle technological steps which
are required to achieve the hypothetical
research results listed in the preceding step.
Such an outline should uncover the more
significant gaps in existing knowledge.
6. Select the small number of high-value research
results, as determined previously, which have
reasonably well-specified steps and a minimum
number of knowledge gaps. Give these results
further examination and consideration for full-
scale research efforts.
7. Remain alert to any developments that could
significantly change the value ratings used in
the preceding steps. When research
breakthroughs fill in missing knowledge gaps,
the process should be repeated. [REF. 8:p. 62-
63 J
The above steps are also useful for government
program managers when defining the technological goals
of SOA extension projects and drafting the SOW.
Accomplishment of SOW items during the development
phase of an SOA extension contract may be the primary
measurement tool for evaluating technological progress.
The bottom-up, parametric and similar-to-cost
estimating models described in Chapter II are the most
widely used cost estimating methods. References 4, 6,
and 7 provide information for further study.
It was time consuming and difficult to identify
a company willing to cooperate in a case study which
offered an SOA extension project useful for analysis.
Several Marketing and Research and Development
Directors were contacted by telephone to determine
interest in and suitability for study.
Companies initially contacted included GTE
Inc.; National Semi-Conductor Inc.; Fairchild Inc.;
Advanced Microcircuit Devices Inc.; Cypress Electronics
Inc.; Acrian Inc.;' Hewlett Packard Inc.; Harris
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Microwave Inc ; Intel Corp. Inc.; Litton Industries
Inc.; and Eaton Semiconductors Inc.
Company responses ranged from "not interested"
to enthusiastic requests for additional information
about the research effort. Companies expressing an
interest in aiding the research effort were then
evaluated on their ability to provide viable projects
for study. Three other Naval Postgraduate School
students had selected SOA extension case studies for
their theses. All of us worked as a team to identify
appropriate firms. These efforts resulted in the
selection of GTE Inc. and Litton Industries, Inc., as
candidates for study by two other graduate students.
LCDR. Fred Voellm, SC , USN , of the Navy
Procurement Office located at LMSC , was contacted for
assistance in identifying a government contract
administered by his office for an SOA extension that
could be studied. LCDR. Voellm produced a list of
contracts that were considered high technology and
potential candidates for study.
Individual contracts were evaluated on the
degree of new technologies and SOA extension, the
availability of initial and actual cost data and the
stage of completion of the contract.
The ANGAS experiment program initiated by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Office in
conjunction with the Research and Development Division
of LMSC was selected because it combined numerous SOA
technological extensions into a design that was unique
and required operation in space. Selection of the
ANGAS project, which is still in early research and
design stages, provided an opportunity to study




Mr. Don Dorsett, LMSC ' s ANGAS contract
administrator, was visited numerous times to obtain
background and cost data. The ANGAS "Weekly Financial
Status Report" and "Work in Process Ledger by Work
Order" provided actual current costs and spending
rates. A summary of this data will be presented in the
data section of this chapter. Mr. Dorsett also
discussed the significant technological and SOA
extension characteristics of the ANGAS project. These
are listed in Chapter II.
LTCOL. George P. Lasche, USA, Geophysical
Sciences Division, Defense Advanced Research Projects
Office, Arlington, VA , is the government's program
manager for the ANGAS program. LTCOL Lasche, USA, was
interviewed by telephone. The project's technological
objectives, goals, potential applications, program
status and evaluation techniques used to analyze
proposed contractor costs will be presented in the data
section of this chapter.
The government program manager for the ANGAS
program authorized access to the principle investigator
at the Lockheed Space Sciences Laboratory in Palo Alto,
CA , Dr. George Nakano . Lockheed's principle
investigator for the ANGAS project is responsible for
technical supervision and overall project direction.
Dr. Nakano was interviewed by telephone and visited at
the Space Sciences Laboratory. His description of the
ANGAS cost estimation effort, accomplishment of
technological goals, spending status, problem areas and
significant SOA extension achievements will be
presented in the data section of this chapter, Appendix
B and Chapter IV.
Cost estimation procedures used by Lockheed
were obtained from Lockheed's Estimating Systems
Description Manual and from a presentation on SOA
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pricing by Mr. Ted Castro, Manager of Lockheed's
Estimating Systems; Mr. Donald H. Palmby, Manager of
Lockheed's Cost Modeling and Analysis; and Mr. Ken
Peeler, Chief Industrial Accountant of Lockheed's
Astronautics Division.
Information and characteristics of bottom-up
cost estimating, parametric cost models and Lockheed's
internally developed STAR cost estimation were
obtained. Input parameters and output data were
obtained for sample SOA extension component cost
estimates using the parametric and STAR cost estimation
models. This information was detailed in Chapter II.
2 . Data Analysis
The estimated ANGAS development costs as
provided in Lockheed's contract proposal and modified
after government audit and negotiation are compared to
actual reported costs. Differences and trends in
specific cost categories are analyzed. Overall
spending rates are compared with anticipated spending.
The results of the data analysis are presented in
Chapter IV.
Significant characteristics of Lockheed's cost
estimating methods and models that are potentially
useful in aiding better estimation of SOA extension
projects by the government are also recorded in Chapter
IV.
The specific methodology that will be used in
the cost analysis will closely follow Dearden's simple
variance analysis as detailed in Cost and Budget
Analysis . Actual costs will be obtained from the ANGAS
"Weekly Financial Status Report" and compared with the
estimated or "budgeted costs" in a variance matrix
format
.
Budgeted costs will define the planned
expenditure for work scheduled for accomplishment
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during a specific phase of the contract. The budgeted
cost from work scheduled (BCVS) for a level of effort
contract, like the ANGAS contract, "is based on
expected expenditures by tasks to be completed." [REF.
9:p. 6]
A determination of the degree of completion for
stated technological goals and task completion is
provided in Chapter IV. Information obtained from the
government's program manager and the ANGAS principle
investigator about the status of the SOW items will be
the basis for establishing task and technological
progress. The reasons why the program manager was able
to :
specify as clearly as possible the basic




will also be discussed in Chapter IV.
C . DATA
1 . Introduction
The Research and Development Division of LMSC
,
Palo Alto, CA , has been funded through an incremental
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to develop the ANGAS. The
major milestones are presented in Appendix B.
In a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, the government
pays allowable cost and a fixed fee. Fixed fee does
not vary with actual costs. Provides minimum
incentive for contractors to control costs.
Completion requires contractor to deliver end
product. Requires specified level of effort over
stated period of time. Used most widely for





The following information details ANGAS funding to
date :
PERIOD EST. COST FIXED FEE COST PLUS FEE
1 $ 1,281,655 $ 68,345 $ 1,350,000
2 $ 3,392,620 $ 192,843 $ 3,585,463
TOTALS $ 4,674,275- $ 261,188 $ 4,935,463
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LMSC submitted a contract proposal on November
26, 1985, after the first incremental funding had been
approved, that covered a 78 month period commencing
April 1, 1986 through completion. The government
choose not to allocate funds for this entire 6 1/2 year
period and has incrementally funded the project. The
contractor's proposed cost for completion of ANGAS was
516,589,398.00 ( CPFF ) . Appendix B contains the SOW
items from the two incrementally funded contracts and
the unfunded proposed completion contract.
D. ESTIMATED COSTS FOR FIRST CONTRACT PHASE
LMSC, Research and Development Division submitted




LABOR HOURS 14 ,688
LABOR DOLLARS $ 319,630
OVERHEAD 506,192










The individual cost element totals were
developed as follows:
1. Direct Labor - direct labor hours are based on
a technical evaluation developed from detailed
analysis of the program requirements. The
labor rates are current averages for direct




















2. Overhead rates are applied as a percent times
direct labor dollars. The rates used for 1985
and 1986 were 1.592 and 1.560, respectively.
These rates apply to R & D projects.
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and Administrative Expenses are also
as a percent times direct labor
The rate used for 1985 and 1986 were
.417, respectively.
G & A EXPENSES
















$319 ,630 $134 ,942
Material requirements were listed, identified
and priced by component. Costs of purchased









Subcontract cost estimates are based on actual
price quotes received from the subcontractors
in response to a RFP . Subcontract costs for
1985 were estimated at $146,700.
Procurement burden is applied at the rate of
.035 of the total estimated costs for
materials, purchased services and subcontract










Travel - per diem rates are based on historical
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1985 12 $ 556 6,672
6 $ 45 270
24 S 91 2,184
36 $ 111 3,966
TOTAL TRAVEL $ 16,064
8. Cost of money is an element of facilities
capital. Rates are applied to direct labor
dollars, general and overhead base and the
procurement burden base.
DEVELOPMENT-LMSC
G & A EXPENSES
PROCUREMENT BURD








































The total of the cost elements is $1,281,655.
Lockheed submitted the contract proposal with a fixed
fee of $99,467, 8 percent of costs. The total CPFF
requested by Lockheed for the first phase of the
contract was $1,381,122.
E. DCAA AUDIT REVIEW
Lockheed's cost proposal was audited by DCAA,
ounnyvale, CA . The results summarized below are set





SUBCONTRACTS $ 146,700 $ 25,379
PURCHASED SERVICES 59,246 59 246
MATERIAL 51,547 51,547
PROCUREMENT BURDEN 9,012 4 ,766
$ 266,505 $ 140,938
DCAA questioned the subcontract costs of $
146,700 because a cost or price analysis had not been
completed by LMSC . Cost or price analysis for
subcontracts is required by FAR 15.806. DCAA,
therefore, applied a 17.3 percent negotiation reduction
factor to the proposed costs. The 17.3 percent factor
is based on DCAA evaluation of subcontract history in
the Astronautics and Space Systems Division.
The purchased services of $ 59,246 and material
of $51,547 were questioned because LMSC did not provide
any data in support of the proposed costs.
The procurement burden was reduced due to the
above questioned costs and the reduced procurement
burden base.
QUESTIONED BASE COSTS $136,172
PROPOSED RATE X 3.5$
TOTAL QUESTIONED $ 4,766
1 . Summary Of Cost And Fee Negotiations
LMSC submitted an SF 1411 with supporting
documentation to justify the questioned subcontractor
costs. This documentation was reviewed and approved by
the negotiator and scientific officer.
LMSC also provided a detailed breakdown of the
questioned costs for purchased services and materials
which was approved by the government. These price
breakdowns were based on past experience on similar
projects, such as project Winkler, catalog prices and
vendor quotes
.
All questioned costs were reviewed and accepted
after negotiation. LMSC had requested a fee of 8
38
percent of costs ($99,467), the government's fee
objective was 4.2 percent. As a result of
negotiations, the settled fee was 5.5 percent
($68,345). The final estimated costs for the first
phase of the ANGAS project was:
ESTIMATED COST FIXED FEE TCFF
SI ,281 ,000 $ 68,345 $1 ,350 ,000
F. ESTIMATED COSTS FOR SECOND CONTRACT PHASE
LMSC submitted a cost proposal dated 26 November
1985 in the amount of $16,589,398, covering a period of
performance of six and one-half years. Audit report
7481 - 6G210136 conducted by DCAA , Sunnyvale, CA
,
questioned portions of every item in the budget. LMSC
was unable to substantiate its cost estimates to the
satisfaction of the government. LMSC was unable to
accurately project costs six years into the future for
a program still in the design phase.
It was decided to contract only for the final
design and sensor shield evaluation of the ANGAS
project. The SOW is illustrated in Appendix B. LMSC
proposed a cost of $ 3,694,580. The costs were broken
down into the same cost elements as the first contract
detailed earlier in this chapter.
1 . DCAA Audit Review And Negotiation
The following proposed costs were questioned
and negotiated:
1. Labor Rates - LMSC used an escalation factor of
4.5 percent. Due to the government ceiling on
salary escalation, LMSC was instructed to






































2. Fee Negotiation - LMSC requested a fee of 9
percent of costs, exclusive of cost-of-money
.
The government's fee objective was 4.9 percent.
A fee of 5.8 percent, exclusive of cost-of-
money , was negotiated.
2 . Summary Of Estimated Costs For
The Second Contract Award
The following chart provides the final


















G. ACTUAL COST DATA
The level of funding, actual expenditure level and
planned spending as of June 30, 1987 is illustrated

























Ai or June 30. 1967
Month mJ(ji| on mirk 1987 — 1988
Actual cost data were obtained from Mr. Don
Dorsett, LMSC ' s contract administrator for the ANGAS
project. The source of the following spending data is
the Weekly Project Financial Status Report, dated
September 31, 1986, which reflects spending at the end
of the first contract phase.
ACTUAL COSTS
FIRST CONTRACT PHASE
EXPENDED TO DATE BUDGET
LABOR HOURS 17,424 hours 13
, 900
LABOR COSTS $ 369 ,323 $ 302 ,464
OVERHEAD $ 556 ,858 $ 510 ,392
G & A EXPENSES $ 184 ,323 $ 147 ,780
OVERTIME PREMIUM $ 24 $
MATERIAL $ 15 ,533 $ 110 ,793
PURCHASED SERVICES $ 36 ,099 $
SUBCONTRACT $ $ 146 ,700
PROCUREMENT BURDEN $ 1 ,678 $ 9 , 012
TRAVEL $ 6 ,657 $ 16 , 064
GRAND TOTAL $ 1 , 170 , 515 $ 1 ,243 ,205
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The difference between the amount funded under
the contract and the budgeted total shown above is the
cost of money and fixed fee amounts.
TOTAL FUNDED ($1,350,000) = TOTAL BUDGETED ($1,243,205)
+ COST OF MONEY ($38,450) + FIXED FEE ($68,345).
Chapter IV discusses the actual "budgeted"
accomplishment and measure of technological progress
for the first and second phases of the contract.
The following cumulative actual costs as of
September 31, 1987, provide actual expenditures for the
first and second contract phases.
ACTUAL COST
FIRST AND SECOND PHASES
EXPENDED TO DATE BUDGET
LABOR HOURS 55, 585 hours 73,653
LABOR COSTS $ 1 ,170,014 $ 1 ,369,867
OVERHEAD $ 1 ,806,416 $ 2 ,023,831
G & A EXPENSES $ 542,392 $ 705 ,570
OVERTIME PREMIUM $ 118 $ 100
MATERIAL $ 360,671 $ 196 ,203
PURCHASED SERVICES $ 59,110 $ 61 ,100
SUBCONTRACT $ $ 146 ,700
PROCUREMENT BURDEN $ 13,116 $ 12 ,380
TRAVEL $ 25 ,606 $ 18,064
OTHER $ 325 $ 125
GRAND TOTAL $ 3,977,768 $ 4,533,950
The difference between the amount funded under
the first and second contract phases and the budgeted
total shown above is the cost of money and fixed fee
amounts
.
TOTAL FUNDED ($4,935,463) = TOTAL BUDGETED ($4,533,950)
+ COST OF MONEY ($140,325) + FIXED FEE ($261,188).
H. INFORMATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM MANAGER
The following discussion is based on a telephone
conversation with LTCOL G. Lasche, USA, the ANGAS
program manager on September 3, 1987. LMSC initially
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proposed the ANGAS project to the government. At the
time, Lockheed had recently completed the four million
dollar Winkler project. Winkler was a scaled down
aircraft-borne spectrometer that utilized many of the
advanced technologies that were to be used in the ANGAS
proj ect
.
Winkler was successfully developed, tested and
flown at the estimated costs. LMSC ' s proposed costs
for ANGAS were evaluated using Winkler's historical
cost data.
ANGAS' technology was more advanced than
Winkler's because it is designed to function in space
rather than the earth's atmosphere. According to the
program manager, projects like ANGAS that incrementally
advance the SOA are usually completed much closer to
the scheduled time and budgeted costs than projects
that attempt quantum leaps.
The incremental funding of the ANGAS contract
allows a structured development and technological
evaluation at key development steps. LTCOL. Lasche,
USA, stated the contract's SOW items and required tests
stipulated in each contract phase provide the primary
evaluation criteria to measure technological progress.
To date all SOW items and tests have been
satisfactorily completed on time.
It was also noted that labor costs are usually
the most significant expense during the research and




This Chapter analyzes the data presented in Chapter
III. The analysis examines cost variances, schedule
variances and the measurement of technological
progress. Significant characteristics of Lockheed's
cost estimating methods and models that are potentially
useful in aiding better estimation of SOA extensions by
the government will also be discussed. The
contributions and role of the government's program
manager for the ANGAS will also be highlighted when
appl icable
.
B. COST VARIANCE ANALYSIS
Table 1 provides the dollar value and the
percentage of cost variances by cost element for the




































TOTAL $1,170,515 $1 ,243,205 +$72,690 5.8£
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Table 1 indicates that negative cost variances 5
during the first funding phase of the ANGAS contract
were realized in labor costs, overhead, G & A expenses
and overtime premiums. These cost elements are
influenced by labor costs either directly or through an
applied rate to a direct labor base.
LMSC had budgeted for 13,900 labor hours. The
number of labor hours actually expended during the
first phase of the contract was 17,424 hours. Dr.
George Nakano , LMSC ' s Principle Investigator for the
ANGAS program, explained that during the early stages
of development additional research and development
effort was put into the sol id-cryogen cooler system.
This was a critical item in the overall SOA extension
effort that has a long lead-time and would be built
outside the Space Sciences Laboratory Division.
All other cost elements experience positive cost
variances during the initial funding. A cumulative
positive cost variance of $72,690, 5.8 % of budgeted
total costs was reported at the conclusion of the first
contract period.
Budgeted labor costs, overhead, G & A expenses and
overtime premiums, all based on direct labor costs,
were budgeted at 77.27 % of total budget costs. Actual
costs for these cost elements accounted for 94.87 % of
actual total costs.
Table 2 provides the cumulative and percentage
variances for the first and second contract phases as
of 31 September 1987:





COST ACTUAL BUDGETED COST VARIANCE AS
ELEMENT COSTS COSTS VARIANCE % OF BUDGET
LABOR $1,170,014 $1,369,867 +$199,853 14. 59$
OVERHEAD 1,806,416 $2,023,831 +217,415 10.75
G & A 542,392 705,570 +163,178 23.13
OVERTIME 118 100 - 18 18
MATERIAL 360,671 196,203 -164,468 83.82
PUR.SER. 59,110 61,110 + 2,000 3.2
SUBCONT. 146,700 +146,700 100
PRO.BURD. 13,116 12,380 - 736 5.9
TRAVEL 25,606 18,064 - 7,542 41.75
OTHER 32_5 125 - 200 160
TOTAL $3,977,768 $4,533,950 +566,182 12.26^
Table 2 indicates that negative cost variances
existed at the end of the second funding phase in
materials, procurement burden, travel and other, cost
element catagories. A cumulative positive cost
variance of $556,182, 12.263 percent of budgeted total
costs, was reported at the conclusion of the first two
contract periods.
LMSC had budgeted for 73,653 labor hours at this
state of the development effort. The cumulative number
of labor hours actually expended during the first two
contract phases was 55,585 hours.
Direct labor and direct labor-based costs were
budgeted at 90.4 % of total budgeted costs. Actual
labor-related costs were 88.4 % of actual total costs.
Total actual costs for the ANGAS project have been
slightly less than budgeted. Dr. Nakano and Mr.
Dorsett, of LMSC, explained that the slightly slower
overall spending rate was partially attributed to the
uncertainties and delays experienced in obtaining
timely approval of incremental funding requests.
Material procurement and research efforts that are
needed for SOW items defined in future phases of the
project would have been initiated in the first and
second phases of the project if future funding had been
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approved. The incremental funding approach adopted by
the government provides control over the project but
also makes the development more difficult for the
contractor
.
Incentives and definite evaluation periods for a
level of effort contract like the ANGAS project are
established through the incremental funding,
establishment of SOW goals for each contract phase and
the ability to adjust future funding based on an
evaluation of past performance and future potential.
The contractor has been provided incentive to
satisfactorily achieve stated SOW goals for the phase
of the contract for which funding has been reviewed.
Future long lead-time items required in later
contract phases of the ANGAS project cannot be
initiated until funding of those contract phases is
approved
.
C. SCHEDULE VARIANCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
Schedule variances provide a way to highlight
situations where effort is behind or ahead of schedule.
The traditional methodology for analyzing schedule
variances compares the budgeted cost of work performed
and the budgeted cost of work scheduled. In a level of
effort development contract, such as the ANGAS project,
a determination of the budgeted cost of work performed
becomes almost impossible to calculate due to the
intangible nature of the goals and SOW items. An
evaluation of technical progress is a more useful
measure when used with the project's cost variances to
evaluate overall benefits and project status.
Analysis of technical variance is probably the most
crucial type of analysis involved in the management
process. It is the one where assistance of other
technical experts may be required. It may also
require some restructuring of the program merely to
determine the cause of the variance. Note that any
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significant technical variance will always result in
cost and schedule variances. [REF. 2:p. 4-20J
Since no significant cost or schedule variances
have occurred in the ANGAS project, the most obvious
indicators of unsatisfactory technical progress are not
evident. LMSC has satisfactorily completed all SOW
items listed in the first and second phases of the
contract. To further analyze technical progress, the
ANGAS project's system engineering will be examined.
MIL-STD 449 defines system engineering as:
the application of scientific and engineering efforts
to: transform an operational need into a description
of system performance parameters and a system
configuration through the use of an incentive process
of definitions, synthesis, analysis, design, test and
evaluation; integrate related technical parameters
and assure compatibility of all physical, functional
and program interfaces in a manner which optimizes
the total system definition and design,; integrate
reliability, maintainability, safety, survivability,
human and other such factors into the total
engineering effort.
The contract SOW specifies the minimum technical
requirements in the contract. Appendix B contains
copies of the first and second contract phase
Statements of Work. Examination of these
specifications reveals that they are composed of
specific configuration, design, performance and
reliability and maintainability requirements. The
program manager, LTCOL G. Lasche, USA, stressed that
the lessons learned in the development of the Winkler
project, which used similar technology, was a basis for
the technical requirements developed for ANGAS. ANGAS
system engineering appears to be a detailed
specification of valid technical goals developed from
past experience and an overall knowledge of the
technologies involved.
It is logical that any analysis of technological
progress be based on status reviews of system
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engineering goals. The government's acquisition
process requires formal and informal design reviews to:
determine the adequacy of contractor and DOD in-
house efforts towards achieving design goals.
Participants should include design attribute
specialists in reliability, maintainability, safety,
and, particularly, logistic supportabi 1 i ty . Reviews
should include a preliminary design review. a
critical design review (CDR), a design certification
review, a functional configuration audit
f
a physical
configuration audit, and a first-article
configuration inspection. [REF. 2:p. 4-49]
The most recent formal review of the ANGAS project
was the CDR which was presented to DARPA on July 21 and
22 of 1987.
The CDR, a formal review of the detailed design of a
configuration item. is performed by the program
manager late in the prototype subphase when the
design detail is essentially complete, but prior to
drawing-release and fabrication of formal test
articles. [REF. 2:p. 4-49]
The critical design review demonstrated that
technical and system engineering goals for the ANGAS
project were accomplished satisfactorily. The CDR
specifically addressed:
1. System Engineering
2. Germanium Detector Subsystem Development (a
critical technical component of the ANGAS
system
)
3. Shield Design (a critical technical component
of the ANGAS system)
4. Mechanical Engineering specifications
5. Electrical Subsystem specifications
6. Source Deployment Subsystems
7. Cooler Subsystem specifications (a critical
technical component of the ANGAS system)
8. Electrical Ground Support Equipment
specifications
9. Monitor Subsystem specifications
10. Instrument Test Plan
11. Reliability, Quality and Safety
12. Instrument Development
In summary, ANGAS technical goals and objectives
have been accurately detailed and specified as contract
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requirements based on past experience obtained from the
development of systems using similar technologies.
Formal and informal reviews and evaluations of
technical requirements have proved that the ANGAS
project's technical goals are both viable and capable
of being accomplished.
This research effort does not attempt to define a
quantitative measurement technique for evaluating
technical variance and accomplishment. An
understanding of the long-range R & D planning steps
developed by Ward D. Lowe and presented in Chapter III
is a useful guide in establishing initial technical
objectives for a proposed SOA extension project.
The prior development of the Winkler Program
reduced the risks and development and provided
technical information on some of the new technologies
used in ANGAS. The following brief description of the
relatively simple multi-attribute utility method,
summarized for the Navy Program Manager's Guide
,
provides an avenue for future study of quantification
of technical goals and measurement.
The model addresses the management of risk that is
inherent in decision making with incomplete
information. Establishing SOA extension technological
objectives and measurement specifications at the
initiation of a project is often based on incomplete
information. The use of this limited information can
be optimized through a five step process which consists
of:
1. Breaking down the tasks to be accomplished into
manageable components or attributes.
2. Estimating the utility factor, the relative
importance of each component or attribute.
3. Developing a utility function or curve which
describes the utility values as a function of
some descriptive variable (i.e., reliability in
terms of mean time between failure.
)
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4. Estimating the risks associated with attaining
the utility values chosen for each attribute.
5. Developing options to avoid or overcome
obstacles to success and to compare alternative
paths, solutions, or concepts.
D. SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCKHEED'S COST
ESTIMATING METHODS AND MODELS THAT CAN AID
GOVERNMENT COST ESTIMATING
Lockheed sometimes uses bottom-up cost estimating
which is usually based on historical data and provides
a high degree of accuracy. Cost estimating and
evaluation within DOD should utilize historical costs,
for completed projects that are similar in scale and
technology, to evaluate projects under consideration.
Use of parametric cost models, specifically the RCA
PRICE Hardware model is used by Lockheed during the
early development and concept exploration phases when
historical cost data does not exist. Parametric cost
models, which allows economic SOA extension trade-off
and schedule analysis, should be used by DOD when
historical data does not exist early in development
stages
.
The Lockheed internally developed STAR model
combines the characteristics of a similar-to-model and
an associated model. This model, which was described
in detail in Chapter II, is based on a historical
database that has been developed over a 20 year period.
The data base represents actual production and
development cost experience, which can be retrieved by
line item or box level based on relatively simple input
characteristics. Development of similar integrated
data base and models within DOD or major components
would significantly enhance the government's ability to
accurately estimate SOA extension costs.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions drawn from this research effort are
based on the data and analysis of the ANGAS project.
These conclusions can be used as a basis for future
studies involving SOA extension cost estimating methods
and case studies.
Primary Research Question : How do estimated
development and production costs compare with
actual costs for the ANGAS project?
Development costs were the primary costs estimated
and recorded to date due to the early stage of
development of the ANGAS project. Total actual costs
were slightly lower than total budgeted costs. Direct
labor and labor related costs were higher than
budgeted during the first phase of development.
Variances did exist within individual cost elements. No
cost element experienced negative cost variances during
both contract phases that were evaluated with the
exception of a $24 and $18 cost overrun in overtime
premiums
.
Subsidiary Research Questions :
1 . What methods and techniques were used to estimate
development costs?
LMSC used a bottom-up, engineering cost estimating
methodology to estimate development costs. These
estimates were generated within the Lockheed Space
Sciences Laboratory based on past experience of costs
incurred developing similar satellite borne systems.
The bottom-up estimating methodology used at LMSC
provided detailed functional and cost element estimates
based on historical cost data and specific contractual
requirements as detailed in the WBS , SOW and RFP
.
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2. How was technological progress measured and
evaluated?
Technological progress was measured and evaluated
by monitoring completion of the specific configuration,
design, performance and reliability and maintainability
requirements stated in the ANGAS Statements of Work
during the formal and informal project reviews. The
program manager for ANGAS was able to state technical
goals and objectives based on experience gained from
the development of a similar spectrometer system that
used many of the same advanced technologies.
3. What factors helped or hindered accurate cost
estimating and accomplishment of stated SOA
extension goals?
Accurate cost estimating was enhanced by the
existence of historical data on similar type SOA
extension development costs. The division of LMSC
that was developing the ANGAS project was also
experienced in developing similar systems. ANGAS
incrementally extended the SOA based on a smaller scale
project that combined many of the same technologies but
was designed to function in the earth's atmosphere
instead of outer space. Historical cost data, technical
experience and incremental SOA extension enhanced cost
estimating accuracy and accomplishment of technological
goals
.
Factors that hinder accurate cost estimating and
accomplishment of stated SOA extension goals arise from
the inherent risks of decision making with incomplete
information. The inability for the government to
accurately specify project design and specification
requirements and monitor accomplishment through formal
and informal reviews greatly hinders accomplishment and
measurement of stated SOA extension goals. Lack of
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historical data, technical experience and inability to
correctly interpret contract requirements hinders





There were no significant variances
between total estimated and total actual costs to date.
Due to the contractor uncertainties associated with the
incremental funding used in the project the spending
rate was slightly lower than planned.
Incremental funding of a DOD SOA extension project
definite contract phases and the opportunity to specify
and evaluate technological objectives during each
phase. This type of funding provides incentives for the
contractor to successfully achieve technological
objectives to receive funding for later phases.
Incremental funding provides leverage and flexibility
to the government in reducing cost overruns and
achieving technological goals. The length of time
required for the development effort is increased with
incremental funding.
Direct labor costs and costs applied as a
percentage of direct labor costs were the most
significant costs during the development phases. These
costs accounted for over 75 percent of total costs in
each phase.
SOA extensions that incrementally advance the SOA
reduce the risk of costs overruns and failure to
achieve technological goals. The historical cost data
and expertise obtained through the development of the
smaller scale Winkler project enabled DARPA to
accurately detail system engineering specifications and
technical test parameters.
The measurement and analysis of cost variances and
technological progress is the primary gauge of
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effectiveness for a research and development effort
administered by a level of effort contract . Technical
progress for the ANGAS project was evaluated as
satisfactory
.
Currently available parametric, analogous and
similar-to cost estimating models used by LMSC and
private industry could be adopted to a greater degree
by the DOD to enhance SOA cost estimating accuracy.
Recommendations for Further Study : Additional case
studies are needed to identify trends in the cost
estimating techniques and accuracy of SOA extension
efforts. The computer based cost estimating models that
are discussed in this research effort and many other
computer based models not addressed in this project
merit a great deal of additional study. Identifying
cost estimating methods that will allow the most
efficient use of limited DOD funding by cost
effectively including new technologies in SOA





Bottom-Up Cost Estimation Model: A Cost estimating
procedure based on detailed functional and cost
element estimates prepared at the lowest practical
level of task and design detail.
Budget: Estimated costs of the effort defined in the
work packages and level of effort SOW items. These
costs should be broken out at the cost account
level. The estimated cost of the effort scheduled
to be accomplished at a point in time within DQD is
termed "Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled" ( BCWS )
.
Critical Design Review ( CDR ) : A formal review of the
detailed design of a configuration item is
performed by the program manager late in the
prototype subphase when the design detail is
essentially complete but prior to drawing release
and fabrication of formal test articles.
Development Costs: Costs associated with research,
planning and design for a new product or process or
for a significant improvement to an existing
product or process. Includes the conceptual
formulation, design, and testing of product
alternatives and construction of prototypes.
Intra-Lockheed Work Transfer ( IWT ) Items: Material
items that are made at Lockheed and transferred at
cost to another entity within the company.
Includes a separate breakdown by cost.
Parametric Modeling: Cost estimating procedure which
utilizes a model comprised of algorithms and
mathematic equations. Estimated costs are derived
from relationships of cost to physical or
performance characteristics.
Purchased Items: Includes material items not
considered standard commercial items or raw
materials
.
Raw Materials: Materials in a form or state that
require further processing.
Standard Commercial Items: Consists of items that the
contractor normally fabricates, in whole or in
part, and that are generally stocked inventory.
State of the Art ( SOA ) Extensions: Used in this thesis
to describe a new weapon system or component that
has incorporated an advancement in technology in a
unique process or for a unique application.
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WBS Dictionary: The WBS dictionary defines each WBS
element and describes the technical / functional task
content and responsibilities.
Work Break Down Structure: A product-oriented family
tree composed of hardware, services and data which
results from project engineering effort during the
development and production of a defense material






1. The work and services to be performed hereunder
shall be subject to the requirements and standards
contained in Exhibit A and the following paragraph(s).
2. The Contractor shall carry out a program of
research in advanced gamma-ray detectors for use in
space which shall include the following tasks:
1. Conduct gamma-ray imaging studies,
2. Establish instrument GSE requirements,
3. Conduct preliminary design of germanium sensor
and anticoincidence shield,
4. Prepare digital signal processing system
requirements and specifications,
5. Prepare cryogenic cooling system
specifications
,
6. Conduct preliminary design of collimator,
wheel, onboard hardware, germanium sensor
electronics, and antishleld housing and
electronics
,
7. Prepare germanium sensor procurement
specifications and antishleld crystal
procurement specifications,






Under Modification P00001 , the Contractor shall
conduct the final design and sensor
/
shield evaluation
of a space demonstration experiment known as the DARPA-
201 ANGAS Experiment aboard a free-flyer satellite
mission. The work shall include the following tasks:
(1) Finalize design of a high sensitivity,fine energy resolution imaging spectrometer, known as
the ANGAS instrument, background monitors and auxiliary
equipment
.
(2) Perform laboratory evaluations and bench
tests of the Ge sensor design and of the Nal shield
system
.
(3) Conduct design studies, computer
simulations and laboratory bench tests for performance
verification of the imagine techniques to be employed
on the ANGAS and finalize the design of the collimator
mask system for the flight instrument.
(4) Provide the electrical, thermal, and
environmental specifications and other interface
information necessary to integrate the DARPA-201
payload aboard the satellite.
(5) Provide all physical. procedural,functional , and safety data necessary to generate an
Experiment Requirements Document (ERD) consisting of:
a) Interface Control Document.
b) Ground Operations Requirements
Document
.
(c) Flight Operations Requirements
Document
(6) Provide the inputs necessary to meet theidentified DARPA-201 milestone schedules. Departures
from these schedules must be mutually agreed to by
DARPA and the LPARL.
(7) Maintain an experiment quality programduring the design and development of the payload.
(8) Design and initiate development of the
ground support equipment ( GSE ) necessary to test and
integrate the DARPA-201 payload with the free-flyer
satell i te
.
(9) Provide DARPA-201 progress and statusinformation and support the mission working group and
status reviews as necessary.
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STATEMENT OF WORK
PROPOSED 16.5 MILLION DOLLAR
COMPLETION CONTRACT
The Lockheed Missiles and Space Company will
provide to the Defense Advanced Research Agency and the
Office of Naval Research the necessary personnel,
equipment facilities and services to conduct a space
demonstration experiment known as the DARPA-201 ANGAS
Experiment aboard a free-flyer satellite mission. In
the conduct of this work the following tasks will be
performed
:
1) Design, develop, test and calibrate a high
sensitivity, fine energy resolution imaging
spectrometer, known as the ANGAS instrument and
an auxiliary background monitor.
2) Conduct design studies, computer simulations
and bench tests for performance evaluation of
the imaging techniques for intended employment
on the ANGAS collimator mask wheel.
3) Based on the timely receipt of the electrical,
thermal and environmental specifications and
other interface information from the
Government. provide the necessary information
to integrate the DARPA-201 payload aboard the
satel lite.
4) Provide all physical, procedural, functional
and safety data necessary, to generate an Experiment
Requirements Document (ERD) consistent with the vehicle
and interface requirements specified in the STP From
1721 (1985). The ERD consists of
a) Interface Control Document
b) Ground Operations Requirements Document
c) Flight Operations Requirements Document
5 ) Provide the inputs necessary to meet theidentified DARPA-201 milestone schedules.
6) Flight qualify the DARPA-201 payload through
the maintenance of an experiment quality program during
the design and development of the payload. The
Principal Investigator will have full responsibility
for conducting all aspects of the quality program. The
quality program practices with the ONR
.
7) Provide the ground support equipment ( GSE
)
necessary to test and integrate the DARPA-201 payload
with the free-flyer satellite.
8) Provide logistics and operation support to the
DARPA-201 payload during definition, integration , test
and on-orbit operations.
9) Provide DARPA-201 progress and statusinformation using the Lockheed R&D standard
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management and accounting practices. Support the
mission working group and status reviews as necessary.
10) Based on the timely receipt of government-
furnished computer-compatible agency data tapes,
analyze the first two years of on-orbit data.
11) Provide flight performance reports as required.
12) Submit the scientific results acquired with the
DARPA-201 instruments for publication in the open
technical literature.
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MAJOR MILESTONES FOR THE
DARPA-201 ANGAS EXPERIMENT
P r o
,j e c t
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c.l An analysis of estima-
ted versus actual deve-
lopment costs for an
electronics State-of-the
Art (SOA) extension.

